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Abstract In this paper we investigate effects of overlap in species between ecosystems
along a linear gradient on the location of marine protected areas (MPAs) under full coopera-
tion, strategic behavior and conservation autarky. Compared to the full cooperation outcome,
both strategic behavior and conservation autarky lead to under-investment in biodiversity
protection. Under strategic behavior, however, we observe the additional problem of “loca-
tion leakage” i.e. countries invest less in species protected by others. Conservation autarky
eliminates location leakage; in ecosystems with partly overlapping species compositions
at country borders it even induces MPAs that are too large from a global perspective. We
also find that, in our setting of a linear gradient without migrating species, countries focus
their conservation efforts on species unique to their own country and that these species are
relatively well protected compared to common species.
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Abbreviation
MPA Marine protected area
1 Introduction
International conservation of biodiversity is high on the political agenda, both in terrestrial
and marine environments (e.g. see Convention on Biological Diversity 2010). One of the main
tools used for the conservation of biodiversity is the designation of reserves. The literature on
reserve site selection has been developed to address the question of where reserves should be
located for efficient conservation. Recent work includes considerations of inter alia connec-
tivity, cost-differences, time-constrained budgets, redundancy and persistence (Polasky et al.
2000, 2001; Cabeza et al. 2004; Costello and Polasky 2004; Beger et al. 2010; Groeneveld
2010).
Biodiversity is heterogeneous across space. Therefore the location of protection has strate-
gic implications. Essentially, the question is whether biodiversity protected in another country
is a complement to, or a substitute for biodiversity that is protected domestically. Moreover,
different locations have different opportunity costs of conservation. Due to the combination
of complement-substitute issues, and differing costs and benefits of protecting different loca-
tions, many opportunities arise for countries to either cooperate or defect on protected area
size or location decisions.
Only recently has the literature on reserve site selection started to address the question of
how the efficient selection of reserves in a region is influenced by the presence of geo-polit-
ical units, e.g. Rodrigues and Gaston (2002), Bladt et al. (2009), Kark et al. (2009), Jantke
and Schneider (2010). These studies, however, compare full cooperation on conservation
among a number of countries with a situation where countries designate reserves without
considering conservation efforts by others. Following the trade literature, we call the latter
setting “conservation autarky”.
On the one hand, conservation autarky seems plausible as countries may value protection
in their own domain higher because they do not trust the protection of relevant species in the
other country; or they may simply not know about species protection in another country; or
they may feel it is their duty to protect species based on moral grounds. Moreover, comparing
full cooperation with conservation autarky is looking at the same problem at different scales,
where full cooperation represents a regional or global scale involving two or more countries.
On the other hand, from an economist’s point of view, it is more likely that countries behave
strategically, i.e. countries do less because a species is protected by another country. We refer
to this phenomenon as “location leakage”. Both kinds of behavior are observed in practice:
e.g. Denmark’s refusal to assign protected area status to the Dogger Bank (a shallow sand
bank in the North Sea) can be interpreted as location leakage—she is doing less because
Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK are already protecting the area. Conservation autarky
is often a result of parochialism: in the Western world much money is spent on protecting
species that are relatively safe globally, such as wolves, bald eagles and grizzly bears (Hunter
and Hutchinson 1994).
The model in this paper studies these issues in detail using a general set-up, consisting
of a linear gradient of ecosystems with overlapping species compositions. In principle, this
set-up could be applied to both the terrestrial and the marine domain. The linear gradient
is introduced to reflect the location of ecosystems, e.g. along a coastline including several
countries. A detailed description of the setting is given in section 2.2. We choose to focus
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on the marine domain, because the strategic issues of biodiversity conservation with large
scale Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) along a linear gradient of ecosystems have not yet
been discussed in the literature.
MPAs have been modeled in several ways over the last decades. Fisheries economists have
considered their use as a fisheries management tool, e.g. Sumaila (1998), Hannesson (1998),
Anderson (2002), Smith and Wilen (2003), Sanchirico (2004), Schnier (2005), Armstrong
(2007), Kar and Matsuda (2008) and Ngoc (2010), and to a lesser extent, their strategic effects
in fisheries (Sumaila 2002; Ruijs and Janmaat 2007; Punt et al. 2010). Most models consider
MPAs as a fisheries management tool only, ignoring other uses; exceptions are Boncoeur
et al. (2002), Dalton (2004), Ngoc (2010) and Punt et al. (2010).
Ecologists have considered reserve site selection problems in the marine environment
with a focus on biodiversity conservation (Sala et al. 2002; Richardson et al. 2006; Game
et al. 2008; Beger et al. 2010). They have studied connectivity, data scale, uncertainty and
persistence, but focus mostly on one country, ignoring the effects of borders which is in
contrast to the terrestrial literature.
Many countries have Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) that comprise a number of eco-
systems providing multiple direct and indirect services. We interpret MPAs as fully protected
zones, with biodiversity conservation as their main goal, but with positive spill-over effects
on direct uses of the ecosystem such as fisheries. The model developed thus reflects the
multiple-use nature that exists in ocean space and that should be considered when making
decisions about MPAs (Punt et al. 2010).
In this paper we formulate a spatial game theoretic model to analyze the issue of strate-
gic behavior versus conservation autarky. MPAs are assigned in one or multiple ecosystems
along a gradient. In contrast to most of the MPA literature, we do not cover the movement
of species or ecosystems that cross political borders, as this has been covered in-depth by
others (e.g. Beattie et al. 2002; Sumaila 2002; Ruijs and Janmaat 2007; Punt et al. 2010). We
assume that if a species occurs in multiple ecosystems, the populations in all ecosystems are
separate and independent. This assumption is valid if the scale considered is large enough.
Furthermore, we restrict our attention to ecosystems boundaries that coincide with political
boundaries.
Our contribution to the literature is therefore twofold: we contribute to the reserve site
selection literature by identifying and comparing the three possible scenarios for biodiversity
conservation through protected areas, rather than the two scenarios that are usually addressed
(i.e. full cooperation and conservation autarky), and we contribute to the MPA literature
by drawing the attention to, at this stage, an understudied subject: the strategic aspects of
biodiversity conservation through MPAs.
Our paper is the first to explicitly compare a setting of strategic interaction with a setting
of conservation autarky in a multiple-use environment. Bode et al. (2011) analyze two trusts
buying land parcels under conservation autarky, strategic behavior and cooperation, but their
agents have differing conservation objectives. Furthermore, we are the first to describe stra-
tegic considerations for biodiversity conservation with large scale MPAs in a setting along a
linear gradient, where MPA location and size are endogenously determined.
The basics of our model are similar to economic models on spatial configuration of ter-
restrial reserves that build on the traditional industrial organization literature, e.g. Goeschl
and Igliori (2004), Albers et al. (2008) and Ando and Shah (2010). These models, however,
often focus on location only, and on a given number of reserves. In our model, in contrast,
location, size and the number of reserves are determined by the preferences for conservation.
We find that for welfare maximization on the one hand conservation autarky implies an
inefficiency because conservation efforts by others are ignored, on the other hand autarky
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eliminates location leakage. Therefore, our results suggest that in our setting, conservation
autarky is still preferred to strategic behavior for the global society.
2 Model Characteristics
2.1 Model Background
We formulate a spatial game theoretic model of MPAs for biodiversity conservation, where
two countries decide on the locations and sizes of MPAs. Assigning an MPA not only gen-
erates ecological benefits, but also entails opportunity and enforcement costs.
The value of ecological benefits can be disaggregated into direct use values and indirect
use values. Direct use values comprise production services, local regulation services, and
over-arching support services. Indirect use values comprise cultural services and option-use
services (Beaumont et al. 2007).
We would argue that there is a scale issue here, whereby direct use values, such as food
or biologically remediated habitats, mainly benefit local exploiters and are less dependent on
biodiversity per se. Indirect use values, in contrast, benefit the global society and are heavily
dependent on biodiversity. Hence, our game will be at least partly a public goods game.
Because we focus on ecosystems and their services, we need to measure biodiversity at
ecosystem level. Consequently, the dissimilarity between ecosystems is a natural starting
point.1 This dissimilarity can be measured by the number of species (Weikard 2002). As we
can never be sure that species are fully protected from extinction, we choose to maximize
the expected total number of species, as in Polasky et al. (2000), Camm et al. (2002) and
Arthur et al. (2004). An important issue when maximizing the expected number of species
is that the survival probability of a species may be dependent on the survival probability of
other species (Mainwaring 2001; van der Heide et al. 2005). Probabilities that ecosystems
stay intact (henceforth: persistence probabilities), however, are independent because they are
stand-alone entities (Weikard 2002).
The reserve site selection literature also focuses on the number of species. Maximizing the
number of species subject to a budget constraint is equal to the Maximum Species Coverage
Problem (Church et al. 1996; Ando et al. 1998; Polasky et al. 2000, 2001; Camm et al. 2002;
Arthur et al. 2004). Minimizing the number of reserves subject to a biodiversity constraint
equals the Minimum Set Cover Problem (Williams and Araéjo 2000; Sala et al. 2002; Stewart
et al. 2003; Cabeza et al. 2004; Richardson et al. 2006). These two problems are the main
building blocks of reserve site selection problems. In our framework, however, we opt to use
a benefit function approach, maximizing the net benefits of conservation. This approach is
more appropriate because we focus on generated ecosystem goods and services and not on
species protection per se. Thus, this approach captures the problem in its full extent.
To use the benefits approach, we need:
(1) An explicit specification of probabilities of ecosystems to stay intact;
(2) An explicit specification of direct use values.
Therefore we introduce the following assumptions:
1 Biologists generally measure biodiversity with indices based on relative abundance and species richness
(e.g. Hill 1973). Others have proposed to measure biodiversity based on dissimilarity between species (e.g.
Faith 1992; Weitzman 1992, 1993, 1998; Solow et al. 1993). Indices that combine dissimilarity, abundance
and species richness also exist (e.g. Ricotta 2004; Weikard et al. 2006).
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(a1) The persistence probability of an ecosystem is directly related to share of the ecosystem
protected by an MPA (henceforth: MPA share).
(a2) Increasing the share of the ecosystem protected by an MPA, increases the direct use
values of ecosystem services by improving their quality.
The reasoning behind assumption (a1) is as follows: by increasing MPA share, an increas-
ing number of keystone habitats and keystone species, i.e. habitats and species that play a
critical role in the ecosystem, are protected. Without the protection of these keystone habitats
and species, the essential features of the ecosystem are lost. The system is then transformed
into another ecosystem, that still supports some species, but often such a new ecosystem has
less value than the original one. Once transformed, it is very difficult to get the ecosystem
back to its original state (Folke et al. 2004). In the marine context, an example is the Dutch
Wadden Sea. If it were to be impacted too much by human activities such as fishing, dredging
and oil and gas exploration, its keystone habitats, undisturbed sandy bottoms and mud flats,
would be destroyed, and many species would be lost. A large MPA would protect the ecosys-
tem from damaging activities in this area, and thus the probability of ecosystem destruction
becomes smaller.
The keystone habitats and species are not just building blocks of the ecosystem, they are
also the main contributors to direct use values and direct ecosystem services, either by pro-
viding a home to species that provide these services or by forming the basis for the service
itself (assumption (a2)). An example of the former is fish habitat, whereas an example of
the latter is sandy beaches that provide tourism services. As the MPA gets bigger, more key-
stone habitats and species are protected and direct services have higher quality. In the case
of fishing, for example, protection of fish habitat could improve the growth rate and carrying
capacity2 of the fish stocks. Of course, harvest would be restricted to a smaller area, which
is reflected in the cost function of MPAs.
2.2 A Biodiversity Conservation Model
In our MPA model, we consider two countries k ∈ {1, 2} that share a common sea. This
common sea comprises the set E of ecosystems. Ecosystems are characterized by a number
of keystone habitats and keystone species, and their destruction would imply the destruction
of that ecosystem. Collectively in all ecosystems, a set S of species exists, consisting of |S|
species, denoted i . Each ecosystem e ∈ E is characterized by a subset se ⊆ S of species, and
consequently each of the i species occurs in a subset Ni ⊆ E ecosystems. Set E is subdivided
over countries k into E1 and E2. See Fig. 1 for an example of our set-up.
The intersection of two sets of species in ecosystems e and e′, se ∩ se′ , decreases with
distance. In this paper we will use a simple exponential decay function to describe this
relationship:
X = Xo exp−rδ (1)
with X describing the set intersection, Xo the set intersection between two neighboring areas,
r the decay rate, and δ the distance between the two ecosystems under consideration (Nekola
and White 1999). This implicitly assumes a uniform decay gradient in all directions. The
reasoning is that many ecosystems are located along environmental gradients. Species that are
very common occur in (nearly) all ecosystems. Other species occur only in specific habitats
of ecosystems, and their specific habitats occur and disappear as we go on along the gradient.
2 The carrying capacity of a fish stock is the size of the stock that it will reach in the absence of fishing.
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Fig. 1 A schematic presentation of the nature protection model. Each of the two countries 1 and 2 own four
ecosystems. In every ecosystem a share can be designated as MPA of size 0 ≤ Me ≤ 1. Ecosystems 1 and 3
in country 1 are partially protected; ecosystem 6 in country 2 is fully protected
We can think of this setting as a long coastline shared by two or more countries where a nat-
ural gradient, such as temperature, or benthos conditions, or salinity, defines the ecosystems
occurring along this coastline, as with the large marine ecosystems on the western coastline
of North America from the USA to Canada, or the Baltic and the North Sea along the coasts
of Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. Alternatively, we can think of a transect between
the coasts of two or more countries where an increasing depth gradient defines the different
ecosystems. As an example, consider the Dutch coast as starting point. The Dutch Wadden
Sea area would then be the first ecosystem. The next ecosystem along the gradient would
be the North Sea itself, and through the Norwegian Sea we end up in the Barents Sea as the
fourth ecosystem.3 The gradient is then defined by a combination of depth and temperature.
Another gradient is that of the Baltic Sea via the Kattegat into the North Sea, where salinity is
the defining element. As stated earlier, we restrict our attention to ecosystem boundaries that
(nearly) coincide with political boundaries, as is the case with the aforementioned gradients.
Each country can decide to protect a share Me (0 ≤ Me ≤ 1) of ecosystem e, i.e. Me is
set apart as an MPA.
The gradient defines the distribution of species over ecosystems, and as such is the most
important factor determining the spatial configuration of MPAs. Along a line, a uniformly
decaying gradient will imply large numbers of unique species in ecosystems at the edges.
The central ecosystems all have a lower number of unique species, as a larger number of
their species is shared with their neighbors.4
We calculate the expected number of species in the following way: persistence probability
of a single ecosystem e is an increasing function of the area protected in that ecosystem, Me:
Prob(e persists) = f (Me), f ′(Me) > 0, ∀e ∈ E . (2)
If species i occurs in ecosystem e, then the probability that species i becomes extinct in
ecosystem e, is one minus the probability that ecosystem e persists, i.e. (1− f (Me)) Species
i is found in the subset of ecosystems Ni , hence the probability that species i becoming
3 The boundaries between ecosystems are in reality not rigid. Moreover, an implication of the assumption
of independence of ecosystems is that there are no highly migratory species that travel between ecosystems,
such as tuna and whales. These species, however, although of great importance to certain ecosystems, are
exceptions. Most species stay within one ecosystem during their life cycle. Species that occur in multiple
ecosystems are therefore considered to be independent populations.
4 Had we chosen a circle instead of a line, then all ecosystems would have had the same number of species
in common. The line mimics the fact that ecosystems at the edges of gradients often have a large number of
unique species.
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extinct in all Ni ecosystems is equal to:
∏
e∈Ni (1 − f (Me)). The survival probability of a
species is then equal to the probability that it does not become extinct in all its ecosystems:5
πi = 1 −
∏
e∈Ni
(1 − f (Me)) ∀i ∈ S (3)
The sum of all survival probabilities of species is the expected number of species.
2.2.1 Full Cooperation Among Countries
Under full cooperation, countries maximize the value V of their joint net benefits. Let ME
denote the vector of all MPAs in the set E of ecosystems, and MEk the vector of all MPAs
in the subset Ek of ecosystems. Countries benefit from direct use values from preservation
and from indirect use values through biodiversity. They maximize:
V (ME ) = DE (ME ) + B
(
∑
i∈S
πi
)
− CE (ME ) (4)
with De the direct benefits from protecting area Me in ecosystem e ∈ E , B are the indi-
rect benefits from biodiversity, and CE (ME ) is the cost of protection.
∑
i∈S πi is the total
expected number of species. Substituting (3) in (4), the maximization problem is:
V (ME ) = DE (ME ) + B
⎛
⎝
∑
i∈S
⎛
⎝1 −
∏
e∈Ni
(1 − f (Me))
⎞
⎠
⎞
⎠ − CE (ME ). (5)
The first order condition (FOC) for an interior solution is:
∂V
∂Me
= ∂ De(Me)
∂Me
+
∂ B
(∑
i∈S
(
1 − ∏e∈Ni (1 − f (Me))
))
∂Me
− ∂C(Me)
∂Me
= 0 ∀e ∈ E .
(6)
Marginal benefits consist of the marginal benefits from direct services and marginal ben-
efits from biodiversity services. Marginal costs of MPAs are the marginal opportunity and
enforcement costs.
This problem can be solved analytically for small problems with only a few ecosystems
and species, and simple specifications of benefit, cost and probability functions. The problem
becomes rapidly complicated when large numbers of variables and parameters are involved.
We present border cases, and a simple example that can still be solved analytically in section 3,
as well as a more complex example where simulations are needed in section 4.
2.2.2 Strategic Behavior Among Countries
Under strategic behavior (or Nash equilibrium), each country takes the decision of the other
country as given when maximizing its own net benefit function. Countries reap the direct ben-
efits of their ecosystems Ek , and bear the costs of MPAs in their own ecosystems. Additionally
5 The survival probability of a species is consequently a function of the persistence probabilities of the eco-
systems it occurs in. As a referee has already correctly pointed out, even though persistence probabilities are
independent, the survival probabilities of species may still be interdependent because species occur in the same
ecosystem. By protecting an ecosystem, we protect multiple species and hence their survival probabilities are
linked.
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the value of the biodiversity services accrues to both countries in equal shares. Consequently,
each country maximizes:
Vk(MEk ) = DEk (MEk ) + 1/2B
∑
i∈S
⎛
⎝1 −
∏
e∈Ni
(1 − f (Me))
⎞
⎠ − CEk (MEk ), ∀k ∈ {1, 2}.
(7)
First order conditions for an interior solution are:
∂Vk
∂Me
= ∂ De(Me)
∂Me
+ 1/2
∂ B
∑
i∈S
(
1 − ∏e∈Ni (1 − f (Me))
)
∂Me
−∂C(Me)
∂Me
= 0, ∀k ∈ {1, 2}, ∀e ∈ Ek . (8)
In contrast to full cooperation, marginal benefits now consist of the marginal benefits from
direct services within a country and half of the total biodiversity services. Marginal costs are
the marginal costs of domestic MPAs only.
2.2.3 Conservation Autarky
In the previous section we have implicitly assumed that from an individual country’s perspec-
tive it does not matter where a species is protected. This gives rise to location leakage, causing
countries to free-ride on the protection of species by others. In a situation of conservation
autarky, it is assumed that the protection of species in one country is not a substitute for its
protection in another country. Countries only account for biodiversity protected in their own
country. Under conservation autarky each country maximizes its perceived benefits:
Vk(MEk ) = DEk (MEk ) + 1/2B
∑
i∈Sk
⎛
⎝1 −
∏
e∈Nik
(1 − f (Me))
⎞
⎠ − C(MEk ), ∀k ∈ {1, 2}
(9)
where Sk denotes the set of species in country k, and Nik denotes the set of ecosystems where
species i occurs in country k. The associated first order conditions for a maximum are:
∂Vk
∂Me
= ∂ De(Me)
∂Me
+ 1/2
∂ B
∑
i∈Sk
(
1 − ∏e∈Nik (1 − f (Me))
)
∂Me
−∂Ce(Me)
∂Me
= 0 ∀k ∈ {1, 2}, ∀e ∈ Ek . (10)
These first order conditions differ from the conditions derived for strategic behavior in the
second term only: marginal benefits of species protection are restricted to species occurring
domestically.
3 Analytic Benchmarks and Example
In this section we explore two benchmark cases and a simple example of a species gra-
dient, that are analytically tractable. We derive first order conditions and MPA shares and
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investigate the main effects of the species gradient under full cooperation, strategic behavior
and conservation autarky, both in the benchmark cases and the variant in between.
3.1 Benchmarks of the Gradient
We consider the outcomes of full cooperation, strategic behavior, and conservation autarky
for two benchmark cases: in the equal ecosystems case, all ecosystems contain all species in
set S, consequently we have E equal and independent ecosystems. In the unique ecosystems
case, all ecosystems are unique, i.e. no species occurs in more than one ecosystem. First
order conditions for the two cases under the three scenarios are given in Table 1.
If f (Me) is equal for all ecosystems, then the form of the solutions for equal independent
ecosystems would be fully symmetric, both for full cooperation and strategic behavior, and
MPA share would be dictated only be the distribution of direct benefits and costs in the
different ecosystems. Free-riding occurs for strategic behavior, i.e. MPA shares are smaller
than under full cooperation, but there is no location leakage: countries do not invest less
in species that are protected by others because of the symmetry. In conservation autarky,
countries ignore contributions by others, and because they have all species in their domain,
they will assign larger MPAs than under strategic behavior. These MPAs are not as large
as under full cooperation because countries only account for the services in their own
country.
If all ecosystems are unique, and no species occurs in multiple ecosystems, there are no
trade-offs in location choice. Consequently, MPA share is determined solely by biodiver-
sity within an ecosystem, and direct benefits and costs on the spot. Again, MPA shares are
smaller under strategic behavior and conservation autarky because they only account for
services generated in their own country. Note that due to the absence of interdependence, the
solutions for strategic behavior and conservation autarky are the same.
3.2 Simple Gradient Example
As a simple illustrative example, suppose we have two countries and three ecosystems, where
each ecosystem has one species in common with its neighbor, as in Table 2. Furthermore,
assume linear benefits (de), quadratic costs with cost parameter ce, and persistence prob-
abilities linear in MPA share. Finally, let us assign ecosystems 1 and 2 to country 1, and
ecosystem 3 to country 2.
The net benefit functions under full cooperation, strategic behavior and conservation
autarky are respectively:
V (ME ) = d1 M1 + d2 M2 + d3 M3
+ ((1 − (1 − M1)) + (1 − (1 − M1)(1 − M2)) + (1 − (1 − M2)(1 − M3))
+ (1 − (1 − M3))) − 12 c1 M
2
1 −
1
2
c2 M22 −
1
2
c3 M23 . (11)
V1(ME1) =
∑
e∈E1
de Me + 1/2
∑
S
⎛
⎝1 −
∏
e∈Ni
(1 − Me)
⎞
⎠ −
∑
e∈E1
1
2
ce M2e
V2(ME2) = d3 M3 + 1/2
∑
S
⎛
⎝1 −
∏
e∈Ni
(1 − Me)
⎞
⎠ − 1
2
c3 M23 . (12)
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Table 2 Example of ecosystem
configuration Country Ecosystem Species
1 e = 1 1, 2
1 e = 2 2, 3
2 e = 3 3, 4
Table 3 First order conditions and solutions to MPA shares of the analytical example
First order conditions Solutions
Full cooperation
d1 + (2 − M2) = c1 M1
d2 + (2 − M1 − M3) = c2 M2
d3 + (2 − M2) = c3 M3
M1 = d1(c2c3−1)+c3(2c2−d2)+d3−2c3c1c2c3−c1−c3
M2 = c1c3(d2+2)−d1c3−d3c1−2c1−2c3c1c2c3−c1−c3
M3 = d3(c1c2−1)+(2c2−d2)c1+d1−2c1c1c2c3−c1−c3
Strategic behavior
d1 + 1/2(2 − M2) = c1 M1
d2 + 1/2(2 − M1 − M3) = c2 M2
d3 + 1/2(2 − M2) = c3 M3
M1 = d1(4c2c3−1)+2c3(2c2−d2)+d3−2c34c1c2c3−c1−c3
M2 = 4c1c3(d2+1)−2d1c3−2c1−2d3c1−2c34c1c2c3−c1−c3
M3 = d3(4c1c2−1)+2c1(2c2−d2)c1+d1−2c14c1c2c3−c1−c3
Conservation autarky
d1 + 1/2(2 − M2) = c1 M1
d2 + 1/2(2 − M1) = c2 M2
d3 + 1 = c3 M3
M1 = 4c2(1+d1)−2(1+d2)4c1c2−1
M2 = 4c1(1+d2)−2(1+d1)4c1c2−1
M3 = 1+d3c3
V1(ME1) =
∑
e∈E1
de Me + 1/2
∑
i∈S1
⎛
⎝1 −
∏
e∈Ni1
(1 − Me)
⎞
⎠ −
∑
e∈E1
1
2
ce M2e
V2(ME2) = d3 M3 +
∑
i∈S2
⎛
⎝1 −
∏
e∈Ni2
(1 − Me)
⎞
⎠ − 1
2
c3 M23 (13)
The relevant FOCs and the solutions are given in Table 3. Because survival probabilities
are linear in MPA share, the resulting survival probabilities of the different species are:
π1 = M1
π2 = M1 + M2 − M1 M2
π3 = M2 + M3 − M2 M3
π4 = M3. (14)
Survival probabilities of species 1 and 4 are equal to the MPA share in ecosystem 1 and 3
because they only occur in those ecosystems. Species 2 and 3 have a weighted sum of MPA
shares as survival probabilities.
The sum of marginal benefits of direct use (de), and the marginal change in the expected
number of species, equal the marginal costs of an additional unit of MPA, ce Me. The FOCs
show the effect of the distribution of species on the optimal location and share of MPAs. Both
species 2 and 3 can be protected in multiple ecosystems, hence the negative effect of M2 in the
FOCs for M1 and M3, and vice-versa, except in the case of conservation autarky, where this
effect only occurs within a country (i.e. for species 2 in country 1), but not between countries.
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In an interior solution, a country introduces at least a small MPA in all ecosystems. This
can be seen from the FOCs: an interior solution requires 0 ≤ Me ≤ 1 ∀e, consequently
2 − Me is always positive, and we get a positive MPA for each ecosystem.
The solutions show that the effects of parameters are ambiguous, and depend on the
value of other parameters, in particular cost parameters. If the denominator is positive and
c1c2c3 > 1 direct benefits of an ecosystem (de) increase the MPA in that ecosystem. Inter-
estingly, for full cooperation and strategic behavior, there is also a positive effect of d1 on
M3, and vice-versa, whereas d2 affects MPA shares in the other two ecosystems in a negative
way. A similar effect is present in the solutions for conservation autarky, but only within
country 1: the de’s of its respective ecosystems have a negative influence on the MPA share
chosen in the other ecosystem. This occurs because ecosystem 2 is partly a substitute for the
other two (or one in the case of conservation autarky). If M1 increases, M2 can be decreased.
Under full cooperation and strategic behavior, this has a domino effect causing a protection
loss for some of the species in ecosystem 3, where, consequently M3 has to be raised to make
up for this loss. This domino effect does not occur in conservation autarky where protection
in other countries is ignored.
The cost parameters determine the sign of the denominator; if the denominator is positive,
Me is decreasing in ce. Furthermore it can be seen that c2 has a positive effect on the numer-
ators and denominators of M1 (and M3 for full cooperation and strategic behavior). How an
increase in c2 changes M1 and M3, depends on relative parameter values.
The reaction functions for the three MPAs under strategic behavior facilitate a further
comparison. These curves are described by the following equations:
M1 = 2(d1 + 1)c2 − d2 − 1 +
1/2M3
2c1c2 − 1/2
M2 = 2(d2 + 1)c1 − d1 − 1 − c1 M32c1c2 − 1/2
M3 = d3 + 1 −
1/2M2
c3
. (15)
The first order conditions in Table 3 and (15) show two strategic effects that will induce
smaller MPAs: free-riding and location leakage. Free-riding occurs because countries do not
account for biodiversity benefits in the other country. This can be seen from the factor 1/2 in
the FOC. Location leakage is clear from (15): if country 1 increases its MPA in ecosystem
2, country 2 will reduce its MPA share in ecosystem 3, and vice-versa. Another interesting
effect of location leakage is that even though M3 did not play a role in the original FOC with
respect to M1, it has a positive influence on the equilibrium outcome of M1. The intuition is
that if country 2 invests in the species of ecosystem 3, location leakage applies in ecosystem
2. This in turn also decreases the protection of species shared between ecosystem 1 and 2,
and therefore the MPA in ecosystem 1 is increased. This effect also runs the other way, even
though it cannot be seen directly from the reaction curves.
The solutions of full cooperation and strategic behavior do not simply differ by a factor
of 1/2 because benefits comprise more than just the public good, and the distribution of eco-
systems and species is not fully symmetric. Conservation autarky is less complex because
countries ignore species’ presence in other countries. The absence of interdependence in the
solutions for conservation autarky is indicated by the absence of parameters relevant to the
share of M1 and M2 in the solution for M3, and vice-versa. M1 and M2 are still interdependent
because they both lie within the same country.
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Table 4 Difference in MPA shares between the different outcomes
Full cooperation—
strategic behavior
Full cooperation—
conservation autarky
Strategic behavior—
conservation autarky
Difference in MPA share in
ecosystem 1
c(2c2−3c+2)
(c2−2)(2c2−1)
2(c2−c+1)
(2c+1)(c2−2)
1
(2c+1)(2c2−1)
Difference in MPA share in
ecosystem 2
2c(c2−3c+1)
(c2−2)(2c2−1)
2c(c−3)
(2c+1)(c2−2)
−2c
(2c+1)(2c2−1)
Difference in MPA share in
ecosystem 3
c(2c2−3c+2)
(c2−2)(2c2−1)
c2−2c+2
c(c2−2)
1−c
c(2c2−1)
To show differences in MPA shares between full cooperation, strategic behavior and con-
servation autarky, we further simplify MPA shares in Table 3 by assuming zero direct benefits
(i.e. d1 = d2 = d3 = 0) and symmetric costs for all ecosystems (i.e. c1 = c2 = c3 = c). The
results are displayed in Table 4.
An interior solution for all Me requires c > 2. In that case, under full cooperation, MPAs
in ecosystems 1 and 3 are always larger than those under strategic behavior. The MPA in
ecosystem 2 under full cooperation is smaller for 2 < c <
√
5+3
2 ≈ 2.6, and larger for
c > 2.6. The differences between full cooperation and conservation autarky are also gen-
erally positive, implying that full cooperation assigns larger MPAs than under conservation
autarky, except in ecosystem 2 for 2 ≤ c ≤ 3 Here, free-riding is outweighed by the fact that
a country considers certain species as unique (although they are not), and therefore overpro-
tects these species relative to the global optimum. By comparing MPA shares under strategic
behavior and conservation autarky, we find that the MPA in the first ecosystem is larger under
strategic behavior, but the others are larger under conservation autarky. In general, because
countries only consider protection in their own ecosystems, species that occur on both sides
of the border receive more protection than under strategic behavior, but not as much as under
full cooperation. Hence, from the global perspective, inefficiencies still occur, even though
the situation is an improvement over strategic behavior.
4 Simulation Model
4.1 Species Distribution and Ecosystem Persistence
We will now explore the effects of a more realistic probability distribution, as well as larger
numbers of ecosystems and species. For the simulation, we will consider a coastline of
ecosystems with a universal decay rate and an equal maximum number of species in each
ecosystem.6
From a matrix of distances between ecosystems and the maximum number of species, a
distribution of species over ecosystems can be calculated. This distribution is exogenous to
our model. Its calculation is explained in Appendix I.
6 A non-universal decay rate would result in more abrupt changes in species composition between ecosys-
tems. An example would be that ecosystems that are neighbors have no species in common. A specification
in two dimensions with a non–universal decay rate would be a more realistic setting, but is more difficult to
solve and adds little to the results found here, except from a richer set of possible solutions and configurations.
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Fig. 2 Examples of possible persistence probability functions of the ecosystem ( f (Me)) as a function of MPA
share. The used parameters are for f1(Me): mean (μ) = 0.75, standard deviation (σ ) = 0.3, for f2(Me):
μ = 0.75, σ = 0.5, for f3(Me): μ = 0.5, σ = 0.2 and for f4(Me): μ = 0.5, σ = 0.1
The persistence probability function is assumed to be a cumulative normal distribution
with a mean (μ) between zero and one, and a small standard deviation (σ ) to keep the rela-
tion between the minimum and maximum survival probabilities, and MPA share between
zero and one. Furthermore, it is assumed that the persistence probability function is equal
across ecosystems. Examples of persistence probability functions for several parameter com-
binations are shown in Fig. 2. The first two functions f1 and f2 are examples of ecosys-
tems where the keystone species or habitat respond directly to protection; their probability
of survival goes up for every extra unit of protected area. Moreover, no minimum area is
required for their survival. An example is plankton in the Antarctic Ocean. Function f4
represents an example where a minimum area is required for protection, for example for
more sedentary species such as mussel banks or coral reefs. Function f3 represents an inter-
mediate case, where the keystone habitats or species benefit from protection in general,
but they benefit more quickly once a threshold is crossed. Furthermore, f2 does not cross
the origin which represents a case where the ecosystem has a positive persistence prob-
ability even without protection. While under f3 and f4 ecosystems can be fully secured,
f1 and f2 represent cases where ecosystems can be lost even at the maximum size of the
MPA.
4.2 The Economic Model
For the economic part of the model, we have to specify a benefit function and a cost
function. For the direct benefits and the costs, we use the same functions as in the ana-
lytic example. As described in the previous section, the persistence probabilities in the
biodiversity part now follow a cumulative normal distribution. We assume linear benefits
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from the expected number of species. Hence, for full cooperation the value function
becomes:
V (ME ) =
∑
e∈E
de Me + b
∑
i∈S
⎛
⎝1 −
∏
e∈Ni
(
1 −
(
1
2
(
1 + erf
(
Me − μ√
2σ 2
))))
⎞
⎠
−1
2
∑
e∈E
ce M2e (16)
where erf is the error function used for calculations of the cumulative normal distribution, μ is
the mean of the distribution, σ is its standard deviation, and b are the benefits of biodiversity.
The equivalent formulation under strategic behavior is:
Vk(MEk ) =
∑
e∈Ek
de Me − 12
∑
e∈Ek
ce M2e
+1
2
b
∑
i∈S
⎛
⎝1 −
∏
e∈Ni
(
1 −
(
1
2
(
1 + erf
(
Me − μ√
2σ 2
))))
⎞
⎠, ∀k ∈ {1, 2}.
(17)
In (17) some of the Me are exogenous to the decision maker as they are controlled by the
other country. For conservation autarky, the specification is:
Vk(MEk ) =
∑
e∈Ek
de Me − 12
∑
e∈Ek
ce M2e
+1
2
b
∑
i∈Sk
⎛
⎝1 −
∏
e∈Nik
(
1 −
(
1
2
(
1 + erf
(
Me − μ√
2σ 2
))))
⎞
⎠, ∀k ∈ {1, 2}.
(18)
4.3 Simulations
We simulate a coastline with ten ecosystems and two countries; each country has the juris-
diction over five ecosystems. Parameter values for the simulations are given in Table 5.
Parameters were chosen arbitrarily such that interior solutions were produced in all cases.
The effects of parameters are later explored in a sensitivity analysis. With these parame-
ters we calculate a species distribution over the ten ecosystems that matches the patterns in
exponential decay (see Appendix I). The resulting pattern is shown in Tables 6 and 7.
Next, we solve the economic model given this species distribution and other parameters,
for full cooperation, strategic behavior and conservation autarky.
To overcome the non-convexities of this problem, we used a hybrid evolutionary algorithm
for full cooperation and conservation autarky, and a hybrid co-evolutionary algorithm for the
strategic equilibrium as described in Son and Baldick (2004). We used an adapted version of
the continuous genetic algorithm described by Haupt and Haupt (2004).
The results for full cooperation, strategic behavior and conservation autarky are shown
in Fig. 3. The ecosystems with the highest number of unique species (ecosystems 1 and 10)
get the highest priority in protection. However, under strategic behavior, a smaller area is
protected than under full cooperation. The differences between the two are not too large
because of the S-shape of the persistence probability.
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Table 5 Arbitrary parameter and set values of the simulation in the base case
Sets Range on elements
E Ecosystems 1–10
E1 Ecosystems 1–5
E2 Ecosystems 6–10
S Species 1–255
S1 Species 1–149
S2 Species 33, 71, 78, 86, 97, 100–104, 118–255
Parameters Values
Maximum number of species in ecosystem (Smaxe ) 50
Xo 1
r 0.9
δ 1 (per ecosystem)
μ 0.75
σ 0.3
de 2 (ke/ share protected)
b 0.2 (ke/expected species)
ce 10 (ke/share protected)
Table 6 Initial distribution of species over ecosystems
Ecosystem Species
1 (1–50)
2 (1–20), (51–80)
3 (21–28), (51–70), (81–102)
4 (29–31), (51–54), (71–74), (81–96), (103–125),
5 (32), (75–77), (81–85), (97–99), (103–117), (126–148)
6 (33), (78), (97), (100–101), (103), (118–124), (126–143), (149–167)
7 (71), (86), (104), (126–131), (144), (149–162), (168–193)
8 (102), (125), (145–147), (149–154), (163–164), (168-181), (194–216)
9 (125), (145), (163), (165–166), (168), (182–188), (194–209), (217–237)
10 (148), (167), (189–191), (194), (210–235), (238–255)
There are two main reasons for assigning smaller MPAs under strategic behavior: free-
riding and location leakage. Free-riding can be generally observed in Fig. 3. All MPAs are
smaller than under full cooperation when countries do not account for the benefits generated
in the other country.
Location leakage is also visible in Fig. 3, but it mainly occurs near the border. Moreover
it causes two strategic equilibria. In equilibrium 1, country 1 is the country that exploits the
leakage, and in equilibrium 2, country 2 exploits the leakage, the result being a much smaller
MPA in the exploiting country and a larger MPA in the exploited country.
From Fig. 3, we can see that most MPA shares under conservation autarky are comparable
to those under strategic behavior, except for MPA shares in ecosystems at borders between
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Table 7 Overlap in number of species between ecosystems
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 50
2 20 50
3 8 20 50
4 3 8 20 50
5 1 3 8 20 50
6 1 1 3 8 20 50
7 1 1 1 3 8 20 50
8 0 1 1 1 3 8 20 50
9 0 0 1 1 1 3 8 20 50
10 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 8 20 50
The matrix is symmetric and therefore only the lower halve is shown
Fig. 3 MPA shares in ecosystems under full cooperation, strategic equilibrium (twice) and conservation
autarky
countries. The similarity is due to the remaining free-riding problem. Ecosystems at the
borders are more strongly protected because countries do not account for protection of spe-
cies in other countries. This eliminates location leakage, and introduces an inefficiency from
the perspective of full cooperation because the substitution of protection across countries is
ignored.
Table 8 shows the total net benefits, and benefits to individual countries. It clearly illus-
trates the occurring inefficiencies with the associated equilibria. Total net benefits to the global
society are highest under full cooperation, and lower under both the strategic equilibria and
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Table 8 Net benefits to the global society and separate countries under full cooperation, strategic equilibria
and conservation autarky
Full cooperation Strategic
equilibrium 1
Strategic
equilibrium 2
Conservation
autarky
Total net benefits 24.58 20.32 20.39 21.45
Net benefits country 1 12.29 10.42 9.94 3.86a
Net benefits country 2 12.29 9.90 10.45 3.87a
Expected number of species 200.38 132.36 132.97 145.97
Total net benefits are calculated using (16) and the MPA shares from the solutions; expected no. of species is
calculated assuming substitution. Net benefits to countries are calculated using (17) for full cooperation and
strategic behavior, and (18) for conservation autarky. a Net benefits to countries for the conservation autarky
scenario ignore substitution possibilities and cannot be compared to the net benefits in the other scenarios
Fig. 4 Histogram of the number of species in survival probabilities categories of species under full coopera-
tion, strategic equilibrium 1 and 2, conservation autarky, and when no protection is applied (i.e. no MPAs are
assigned). The size of each category is 0.1
conservation autarky. The inefficiency under conservation autarky is smaller for our param-
eter values. In general, conservation autarky is probably preferred to strategic behavior.
These distinct differences are also found in the survival probabilities of individual spe-
cies. In Fig. 4 we show histograms of survival probabilities of species under full cooperation,
both strategic equilibria, conservation autarky and the original survival probabilities in the
absence of MPAs (no protection).
Figure 4 shows that under full cooperation, the survival probability of most species is
between 0.7 and 0.9. In both strategic equilibria, in contrast, the survival probability of
the majority of species is between 0.4 and 0.7. Compared with full cooperation, species
are protected less than necessary. Under conservation autarky, most species have survival
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Fig. 5 MPA share under full cooperation, strategic equilibrium and conservation autarky when μ = 0.75 and
σ = 0.5
probabilities between 0.5 and 0.9. This is an improvement compared to both strategic equi-
libria, but it is still not as good as full cooperation. In the no protection case, all species have
a very low (below 0.02) survival probability.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Our sensitivity analysis is limited to the effect of the ecological parameters of the model,
because the effects of economic parameters are in line with intuition. Their effects are
explained in detail in Appendix II.
The ecological parameters describing the persistence probability mainly affect the con-
servation pattern in the ecosystems that contain common species. A low σ , indicating a
very steep probability curve (cf. Fig. 2), induces a conservation pattern where conservation
is concentrated in a few ecosystems with large MPAs and small MPAs in the neighboring
ecosystems. A higher σ induces a more even spread pattern with overall smaller MPAs. The
MPAs in ecosystems 1 and 10 are always larger than MPAs in other ecosystems, and in the
conservation autarky case, ecosystem 5 and 6 also have large MPAs. This is clearly shown
in Fig. 5, where we show full cooperation, strategic behavior and conservation autarky for
μ = 0.75 and σ = 0.5 Changing μ does not alter the pattern of MPA designation, but it
mainly changes the level. Increasing μ raises MPA levels, and decreasing μ decreases them.
The decay rate r determines the overlap between ecosystems and hence the number of
unique species in each ecosystem. An increase in r induces a smaller overlap between ecosys-
tems and hence more unique species. Given that we fix the number of species per ecosystem,
it also increases the total number of species needed to generate a species distribution over
ecosystems, because each ecosystem now requires a higher number of unique species.
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Fig. 6 MPA share under full cooperation, strategic equilibrium, and conservation autarky, when r = 0.65
and number of species = 200
A decrease in r lowers the MPA share for two reasons: firstly, fewer species exist, and sec-
ondly, fewer unique species exist. Figure 6 shows the MPA shares under the three scenarios
with r = 0.65 and 200 species. The ecosystems with the (perceived) unique species are still
almost fully protected, but other ecosystems have much smaller MPAs under these parameter
values. Some ecosystems have become increasingly valuable, because the complete species
distribution has changed and more unique species occur elsewhere. This also results in a
different conservation pattern.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a game theoretic model for the allocation of MPAs along a
linear gradient, where ecosystems have overlapping species compositions. We have inves-
tigated the full cooperation case, and compared it with strategic behavior and conservation
autarky. In both cases, compared to full cooperation, ecosystems and species are under-
protected due to free–riding. However, while under strategic behavior, all ecosystems are
generally under-protected, under conservation autarky, species at the border receive a higher
level of protection. The fundamental difference between these two scenarios is whether or not
countries consider species protection in another country a substitute for domestic protection.
Conservation autarky is generally inefficient because biodiversity conservation in one
country can be a substitute for conservation in another country. However, in our analysis
conservation autarky is less inefficient than strategic behavior. Ignoring a species existing
elsewhere may actually be beneficial in a global perspective. Conservation autarky elimi-
nates location leakage, and species are no longer under-protected at the borders, but rather
over-protected compared to full cooperation. Free–riding, however, remains.
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An important result from our simulations is that even when a country chooses to behave
strategically, most unique species are still relatively well protected compared to common
species. It can be observed from Figs. 3, 5 and 6 that the largest differences in MPA shares
under strategic behavior compared to full cooperation, are found in ecosystems with species
that occur in both countries. This finding makes sense from a valuation point of view: unique
species are the most valuable and therefore most heavily protected. Location leakage cannot
occur for these species precisely because they are unique. Common species, in contrast, can
be protected elsewhere, and therefore countries under-protect these species and ecosystems,
compared to full cooperation. Exceptions are those unique species occurring only in eco-
systems next to heavily protected ecosystems. These species become less protected, because
neighboring ecosystems are heavily protected. They suffer from “local location leakage” and
are “forgotten unique species”.
In contrast to most of the reserve site selection literature on conservation across borders we
focused on the marine domain. However, our model approach can also be used in a terrestrial
setting, if the basic assumptions hold, most importantly if the effect of migration is small.
The qualitative results of the model remain the same.
Also in contrast to the reserve site selection literature we have used a benefits approach
rather than the Maximum Species Coverage Problem or the Minimum Set Cover Problem. If
we had we used these methods, the difference between the three scenarios would probably
be larger because these methods value species protection and costs only and ignore direct
benefits. Using these approaches the game becomes a pure public goods game, rather than a
partly public goods game as it is in our model.
A well-known question in ecology, related to the substitution effect, is whether we should
select a Single Large Or Several Small (SLOSS problem) reserves. In our model, the answer
to this question is shown to be dependent on the distribution of species over ecosystems and
the persistence probability of ecosystems. If the persistence probability curve is the same in
all ecosystems, species have a large range, and the persistence probability curve of ecosys-
tems is sufficiently steep, then a single large reserve is better. This is because a large reserve
is needed to reach a decent level of protection, and a lot of species can be protected in that
single area. If many rare species exist and the curve is sufficiently flat, several small reserves
are better because only small reserves are needed for a decent level of protection, and each
added reserve adds extra protected species. These results, however hinge on the similarity of
the persistence probability curve across ecosystems. A general answer to the SLOSS problem
cannot be given.
In our study of international cooperation on MPA allocation at the ecosystem level we
assume that all services and the distribution of the effects of the MPA are accounted for. As
shown by Punt et al. (2010), accounting fully for all services is an important condition for
the optimal allocation of MPAs because cooperating on a single issue, and ignoring another,
can produce worse outcomes than behaving strategically and taking all effects into account.
We have shown how the distribution of species over ecosystems affects the assignment of
MPAs in neighboring ecosystems through location leakage. Location leakage induces pref-
erences to spread MPAs. This is similar to the analysis for terrestrial conservation as, for
instance, in Albers et al. (2008).
Although we have shown how the location of MPAs across ecosystems matters, the dis-
tribution of MPAs within an ecosystem is also very important, especially if an ecosystem
crosses the border between countries. In the latter case, the movement of species determines
who bears the cost and who reaps the benefits (Ruijs and Janmaat 2007). We do not consider
such movements in this paper, but conjecture that trans-boundary migration of species would
increase free-riding and location leakage.
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In our simulations most of the parameters are symmetric, except the distribution of species.
This asymmetry is the reason that two strategic equilibria exist, showing different distribu-
tions for the gains. Asymmetry in other aspects than distribution of species would alter spatial
conservation patterns, but our general conclusions remain.
This paper is the first to investigate the effect of strategic behavior in biodiversity conser-
vation across marine ecosystems. We conclude that strategic behavior is an important, yet
ignored effect in conservation planning. In the past, the emphasis may have been too much
on conservation autarky, neglecting the dangers of free-riding and location leakage. As we
have shown, conservation autarky may be preferable if it is compared with strategic behavior.
In the light of our analysis, international cooperation efforts on the protection of species
should focus on three areas:
• Common species. Species that are known to occur in ecosystems on both sides of the
borders will most likely be under–protected through location leakage.
• “Forgotten” unique species. Some unique species may suffer from local location leakage,
i.e. their ecosystem is not well protected either because of location leakage or because
neighboring ecosystems are well protected.
• Species that occur in ecosystems that have low direct benefits of protection (or high
costs). These are likely to be under-protected if countries do not cooperate. Free-riding
on indirect benefits will have a relatively large impact if direct benefits are small.
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Appendix I: Calculation of the Distribution of Species Over Ecosystems
Given a set of species and ecosystems, a universal decay rate, a matrix of distances between
ecosystems and the maximum number of species in each ecosystem a distribution of species
over ecosystems, Distributioni,e, can be calculated with a simple mathematical model.
Starting from a dummy objective:
DUM =
∑
e∈E
∑
i∈s
Distributioni,e (19)
where DUM is a variable used for the maximization, and Distribution is a binary matrix
denoting species i’s presence (1) or absence (0) in ecosystem e, and is the actual variable of
interest.
Each ecosystem e has a number of species, |se|, and this number is exogenously given.
In the distribution we want all ecosystems to contain that number of species, therefore we
require:
|se| =
∑
i∈s
Distributioni,e ∀e ∈ E . (20)
Consider the number of species common to two ecosystems. The similarity Sime,h (in
number of species) between two ecosystems e, h ∈ E , is calculated with the distance decay
function as follows:
Sime,h = (Xo exp−rδ) min(Smaxe , Smaxh ) ∀e, h ∈ E, e = h (21)
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with X0 the maximum similarity (usually one), r the decay rate, and δ the distance between
ecosystem e and h. The minimization term adjusts the similarity for the number of species
present in each area.
Given a distribution of species over ecosystems, Distribution, we can check whether this
distribution matches the required similarity, Sime,h , by calculating the similarity implied by
this distribution. This similarity Overlape,h is calculated as follows:
Overlape,h = DistributionT × Distribution (22)
with DistributionT denoting the transpose of the distribution matrix. Thus the full model
becomes:
max DUM =
∑
e∈E
∑
i∈S
Distributioni,e
s.t. Smaxe =
∑
i∈S
Distributioni,e ∀e ∈ E
Sime,h = Overlape,h ∀e, h ∈ E . (23)
Although the model sketched above is strictly speaking a Mixed Integer Non-Linear
Problem, it can be approximated with a normal Non-Linear Problem (NLP) by letting
Distribution be continuous over the interval [0,1]. Through rounding of Sime,h to the
nearest integer, and equalizing it with Overlape,h we have constraints consisting of integers
only, thus the solution of the NLP will coincide with the mixed integer variant. The solution
to (23) is usually not unique as many configurations satisfy the constraints and the maximum
value of the objective variable is the same for all those configurations.
Appendix II: Sensitivity Analysis of Economic Parameters
The parameters describing locations in terms of costs and benefits have opposite effects.
Raising direct benefits of MPAs in a certain ecosystem increases the MPA share in that
ecosystem and decreases the MPA in adjoining ecosystems for full cooperation, strategic
behavior, and conservation autarky. In the case of conservation autarky however, the effect
is limited to a country, as countries only consider their own species and ecosystems. Raising
the costs in one location has the opposite effect. This can be seen from Fig. 7, where we
doubled the costs in ecosystem 6. Compared with Fig. 3, the MPA is lower in ecosystem 6
and MPAs in neighboring ecosystems are larger, except under conservation autarky where
cross-border effects do not exist. The effect of an increased cost of conservation is clearest
in neighboring ecosystems, and decreases with distance. Ecosystems 1 and 10 for example,
are hardly affected (cf. Fig. 3).
Incidentally, the introduction of the sharp asymmetry in costs also removes one of the
strategic equilibria. Country 2 now always assigns a small MPA in ecosystem 6 because of
the high costs. This decision in turn reduces the possibilities for location leakage.
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Fig. 7 MPA shares in ecosystems under full cooperation, strategic equilibrium and conservation autarky when
the costs in ecosystem 6 are increased by 100 %
References
Albers HJ, Ando AW, Batz M (2008) Patterns of multi-agent land conservation: crowding in/out, agglomera-
tion, and policy. Resour Energy Econ 30:492–508
Anderson LG (2002) A bioeconomic analysis of marine reserves. Nat Resour Model 15:311–334
Ando A, Camm J, Polasky S, Solow A (1998) Species distributions, land values, and efficient conservation.
Science 279:2126
Ando AW, Shah P (2010) Demand-side factors in optimal land conservation choice. Resour Energy Econ
32:203–221
Armstrong CW (2007) A note on the ecological-economic modelling of marine reserves in fisheries. Ecol
Econ 62:242–250
Arthur JL, Camm JD, Haight RG, Montgomery CA, Polasky S (2004) Weighing conservation objectives:
maximum expected coverage versus endangered species protection. Ecol Appl 14:1936–1945
Beattie A, Sumaila UR, Christensen V, Pauly D (2002) A model for the bioeconomic evaluation of marine
protected area size and placement in the North Sea. Nat Resour Model 18:413–437
Beaumont NJ, Austen MC, Atkins JP, Burdon D, Degraer S, Dentinho TP, Derous S, Holm P, Horton T,
van Ierland EC, Marboe AH, Starkey DJ, Townsend M, Zarzycki T (2007) Identification, definition and
quantification of goods and services provided by marine biodiversity: implications for the ecosystem
approach. Mar Pollut Bull 54:253–265
Beger M, Linke S, Watts M, Game E, Treml E, Ball I, Possingham HP (2010) Incorporating asymmetric
connectivity into spatial decision making for conservation. Conserv Lett 3:359–368
Bladt J, Strange N, Abildtrup J, Svenning J-C, Skov F (2009) Conservation efficiency of geopolitical coordi-
nation in the EU. J Nat Conserv 17:72–86
Bode M, Probert W, Turner WR, Wilson KA, Venter O (2011) Conservation planning with multiple organi-
zations and objectives. Conserv Biol 25:295–304
Boncoeur J, Alban F, Guyader O, Thébaud O (2002) Fish, fishers, seals and tourists: economic consequences
of creating a marine reserve in a multi-species, multi-activity context. Nat Resour Model 15:387–411
Cabeza M, Araújo MB, Wilson RJ, Thomas CD, Cowley MJR, Moilanen A (2004) Combining probabilities
of occurrence with spatial reserve design. J Appl Ecol 41:252–262
Camm JD, Norman SK, Polasky S, Solow AR (2002) Nature reserve site selection to maximize expected
species covered. Oper Res 50:946–955
123
Large Scale Marine Protected Areas for Biodiversity Conservation 227
Church RL, Stoms DM, Davis FW (1996) Reserve selection as a maximal covering location problem. Biol
Conserv 76:105–112
Convention on Biological Diversity (2010) COP 10 Decisions. http://www.cbd.int/decisions/cop/?m=cop-10.
Cited 11-11-2011
Costello C, Polasky S (2004) Dynamic reserve site selection. Resour Energy Econ 26:157–174
Dalton TM (2004) An approach for integrating economic impact analysis into the evaluation of potential
marine protected area sites. J Environ Manag 70:333–349
Faith DP (1992) Conservation evaluation and phylogenetic diversity. Biol Conserv 61:1–10
Folke C, Carpenter S, Walker B, Scheffer M, Elmqvist T, Gunderson L, Holling C (2004) Regime shifts,
resilience, and biodiversity in ecosystem management. Annu Rev Ecol Evol Syst 35:557–581
Game ET, Watts ME, Wooldridge S, Possingham HP (2008) Planning for persistence in marine reserves: a
question of catastrophic importance. Ecol Appl 18:670–680
Goeschl T, Igliori DC (2004) Reconciling conservation and development: a dynamic hotelling model of extrac-
tive reserves. Land Econ 80:340–354
Groeneveld RA (2010) Species-specific spatial characteristics in reserve site selection. Ecol Econ 69:2307–
2314
Hannesson R (1998) Marine reserves: what would they accomplish?. Mar Resour Econ 13:159–170
Haupt RL, Haupt SE (2004) Practical genetic algorithms. Wiley, Hoboken
Hill MO (1973) Diversity and evenness: a unifying notation and its consequences. Ecology 54:427–432
Hunter ML, Hutchinson A (1994) The virtues and shortcomings of parochialism: conserving species that are
locally rare, but globally common. Conserv Biol 8:1163–1165
Jantke K, Schneider UA (2010) Multiple-species conservation planning for European wetlands with different
degrees of coordination. Biol Conserv 143:1812–1821
Kar TK, Matsuda H (2008) A bioeconomic model of a single-species fishery with a marine reserve. J Environ
Manag 86:171–180
Kark S, Levin N, Grantham HS, Possingham HP (2009) Between-country collaboration and consideration
of costs increase conservation planning efficiency in the Mediterranean Basin. Proc Natl Acad Sci
106:15368–15373
Mainwaring L (2001) Biodiversity, biocomplexity, and the economics of genetic dissimilarity. Land Econ
77:79–93
Nekola JC, White PS (1999) The distance decay of similarity in biogeography and ecology. J Biogeogr 26:867–
878
Ngoc Q (2010) Creation of marine reserves and incentives for biodiversity conservation. Nat Resour Model
23:138–175
Polasky S, Camm JD, Garber-Yonts B (2001) Selecting biological reserves cost-effectively: an application to
terrestrial vertebrate conservation in Oregon. Land Econ 77:68–78
Polasky S, Camm JD, Solow AR, Csuti B, White D, Ding R (2000) Choosing reserve networks with incomplete
species information. Biol Conserv 94:1–10
Punt MJ, Weikard HP, Groeneveld RA, van Ierland EC, Stel JH (2010) Planning marine protected areas: a
multiple use game. Nat Resour Model 23:610–646
Richardson EA, Kaiser MJ, Edwards-Jones G, Possingham HP (2006) Sensitivity of marine-reserve design to
the spatial resolution of socioeconomic data. Conserv Biol 20:1191–1202
Ricotta C (2004) A parametric diversity measure combining the relative abundances and taxonomic distinc-
tiveness of species. Divers Distrib 10:143–146
Rodrigues ASL, Gaston KJ (2002) Rarity and conservation planning across geopolitical units. Conserv Biol
16:674–682
Ruijs A, Janmaat J (2007) Chasing the spillovers: locating protected areas in a trans-boundary fishery. Land
Econ 83:6–22
Sala E, Aburto-Oropeza O, Paredes G, Parra I, Barrera JC, Dayton PK (2002) A general model for designing
networks of marine reserves. Science 298:1991–1993
Sanchirico JN (2004) Designing a cost-effective marine reserve network: a bioeconomic metapopulation anal-
ysis. Mar Resour Econ 19:41–65
Schnier KE (2005) Biological “hot spots” and their effect on optimal bioeconomic marine reserve formation.
Ecol Econ 52:453–468
Smith MD, Wilen JD (2003) Economic impacts of marine reserves: the importance of spatial behavior.
J Environ Econ Manag 46:183–206
Solow A, Polasky S, Broadus J (1993) On the measurement of biological diversity. J Environ Econ Manag
24:60–68
Son YS, Baldick R (2004) Hybrid coevolutionary programming for Nash equilibrium search in games with
local optima. IEEE Trans Evol Comput 8:305–315
123
228 M. J. Punt et al.
Stewart RR, Noyce T, Possingham HP (2003) Opportunity cost of ad hoc marine reserve design decisions: an
example from South Australia. Mar Ecol Prog Ser 253:25–38
Sumaila UR (1998) Bioeconomics and the ecopath/ecosim framework. In: Pauly D (ed) Use of Ecopath with
Ecosim to evaluate strategies for sustainable exploitation of multispecies resources. Fisheries Centre,
University of British Columbia, Vancouver
Sumaila UR (2002) Marine protected area performance in a model of the fishery. Nat Resour Model 15:439–
451
van der Heide CM, van den Bergh JCJM, van Ierland EC (2005) Extending Weitzman’s economic ranking of
biodiversity protection: combining ecological and genetic considerations. Ecol Econ 55:218–223
Weikard HP (2002) Diversity functions and the value of biodiversity. Land Econ 78:20–27
Weikard HP, Punt M, Wesseler J (2006) Diversity measurement combining relative abundances and taxonomic
distinctiveness of species. Divers Distrib 12:215–217
Weitzman ML (1992) On diversity. Q J Econ 107:363–405
Weitzman ML (1993) What to preserve? An application of diversity theory to crane conservation. Q J Econ
108:155–183
Weitzman ML (1998) The Noah’s ark problem. Econometrica 66:1279–1298
Williams PH, Araéjo MB (2000) Using probability of persistence to identify important areas for biodiversity
conservation. Proc R Soc Lond Ser B Biol Sci 267:1959–1966
123
